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A PUBLIC CONCERN: PROTECTING
WHISTLEBLOWERS UNDER THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
Steven Still*
The United States has just witnessed an impeachment debate which may
have far-reaching ramifications for our democratic institutions. These
hostilities began with an anonymous whistleblower complaint from a
government employee, disclosing what he or she believed were illegal
activities directed by President Donald J. Trump. Ever since, discussion of
whistleblowers has taken on greater salience in the news cycle.
Today, there are a number of whistleblower statutes that protect
employees who disclose knowledge of their employer’s illicit activities from
workplace retaliation. Although whistleblowing is not unique to government
workers, these individuals have an added layer of protection afforded to them
by the First Amendment. Free speech protections for public employees, first
recognized in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1968 decision in Pickering v. Board
of Education, have since developed an expansive body of case law. Vague
terminology and legal standards have led to inconsistent rulings among
courts. This Note argues that greater consistency in the treatment of
whistleblowers is possible by refocusing on the key underlying principle
articulated in Pickering: the public’s right to hear information that can add
to public discourse. This Note proposes that the existing framework should
be modified so as not to categorically preclude free speech protection for
expressions made “as an employee.”
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INTRODUCTION
I cannot too often repeat my belief that the right to speak on matters of
public concern must be wholly free or eventually be wholly lost.
—Justice Hugo Black1

More than twenty-two million public employees work for federal, state, or
local governments in the United States.2 The modern administrative
bureaucracy has grown so rapidly and become so expansive that it is difficult
to discern how many federal agencies exist; the answer depends largely on
who you ask.3 Indeed, the government is a sprawling enterprise that employs
individuals from nearly all walks of life: doctors, attorneys, scientists,
teachers, members of the armed services, and law enforcement officers are
just a few.4
Some employees who disclose unethical or illegal activities at work to
their “supervisors, the public, the media, or the government” are referred to

1. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 193 (1952) (Black, J., concurring).
2. Employment Projections: Employment by Major Industry Sector, U.S. BUREAU LAB.
STAT., https://www.bls.gov/emp/tables/employment-by-major-industry-sector.htm [https://
perma.cc/5ERM-RKCR] (last updated Sept. 4, 2019).
3. Clyde Wayne Crews, Nobody Knows How Many Federal Agencies Exist,
COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INST. (Aug. 26, 2015), https://cei.org/blog/nobody-knows-howmany-federal-agencies-exist [https://perma.cc/CWU2-SWC8].
4. See A–Z Index of U.S. Government Departments and Agencies, USA.GOV,
https://www.usa.gov/federal-agencies [https://perma.cc/ASX4-JCPL] (last visited Feb. 14,
2020).
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as “whistleblowers.”5 Edward Snowden is a current example, but
whistleblowers have been essential to public discourse in the United States
since the nation’s infancy.6 American history is flush with examples of
individuals who brought about sweeping changes by disclosing inside
knowledge of illicit activity, even before the term “whistleblower” entered
the public lexicon.7 Going back as far as 1777, American sailors who
revealed that the commodore of the United States Navy had tortured British
captives would be considered whistleblowers nowadays.8 More recently, Dr.
Jeffrey Wigand, a former tobacco company executive, was integral in
exposing the industry’s deception of regulators concerning the dangers of
tobacco products.9
With the 2020 presidential election looming and the country still reeling
from an impeachment debate triggered by an anonymous whistleblower
complaint, the ability of government whistleblowers to influence the public
zeitgeist cannot be overstated.10 Public sector employees often possess
intimate knowledge of the inner workings of government, which enables
them to act as society’s bulwark against governmental corruption or
misconduct.11 Senator Charles Grassley, former chairman of the Senate
Judiciary Committee and coauthor of the Whistleblower Protection Act of
1989,12 has argued that whistleblowers are crucial for congressional
oversight, which allows Congress to legislate more effectively.13
However, whistleblowers may face severe consequences such as
termination, reprimand, hostile work environments, or other retaliatory
employment practices because such disclosures can negatively affect their
superiors.14 Fear of these consequences can silence dissent, thereby allowing
illegal and unethical conduct to thrive.15 According to Merit System
5. Joseph O. Oluwole, Eras in Public Employment–Free Speech Jurisprudence, 32 VT.
L. REV. 319, 319 (2007).
6. See Stephen M. Kohn, Opinion, The Whistle-Blowers of 1777, N.Y. TIMES (June 12,
2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/13/opinion/13kohn.html [https://perma.cc/S4XDVNVH].
7. See ROBERT G. VAUGHN, THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF WHISTLEBLOWER LAWS 4–
5 (2012).
8. Id. at 4.
9. Peter S. Menell, Tailoring a Public Policy Exception to Trade Secret Protection, 105
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 6 (2017).
10. See Letter from Anonymous Whistleblower to Senator Richard Burr, Chairman of
Senate Comm. on Intelligence and Representative Adam Schiff, Chairman of the House
Permanent
Select
Comm.
on
Intelligence
(Aug.
12,
2019),
https://
intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/20190812_-_whistleblower_complaint_unclass.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WC2P-9KSU].
11. See Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2380 (2014).
12. Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 and
22 U.S.C.).
13. Chuck Grassley, Chuck Grassley: We Need Whistleblowers for Good Government,
IOWA STARTING LINE (Sept. 26, 2019, 12:29 PM), https://iowastartingline.com/2019/09/
26/chuck-grassley-we-need-whistleblowers-for-good-government/ [https://perma.cc/TBM5WYRL].
14. Oluwole, supra note 5, at 319.
15. See Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380 (explaining that employees are “torn” between an
obligation to testify against their employer and a desire to avoid retaliation).
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Protection Board studies from 1980 and 1983, conducted before the passage
of the Whistleblower Protection Act, a substantial portion of the federal
employees with knowledge of government waste, fraud, and abuse chose not
to report it.16 Many cited fear of reprisal as the reason that they did not come
forward.17 Aside from direct retaliation, other forces such as loyalty towards
employers, damage to work relationships, and stunted career opportunities
can deter whistleblowers.18
Recognizing the need for transparency in all employment sectors, various
statutory whistleblower provisions provide protection from employment
consequences and incentivize employees to come forward.19 Such measures
are especially important when those in power may attempt to silence
whistleblowers for their own gain.20 As Senator Grassley put it, without
adequate protections, “the whistleblower’s only hope is like the desperate
Charge of the Light Brigade, and there are rarely any survivors.”21 The
numerous whistleblower provisions in effect today are often highly
specialized and can vary drastically depending on the field of employment
and jurisdiction.22
Unlike private sector employees who must rely on the shifting sands of
whistleblower statutes to provide some cover, public employees can also take
advantage of the First Amendment’s free speech protections.23 Because the
Bill of Rights applies only to government actions, the First Amendment
restrains a public employer’s ability to discipline employees for their
expressions.24 Beginning with its landmark decision in Pickering v. Board
of Education,25 the U.S. Supreme Court has established a balancing test for
determining if the interests in allowing public sector employees to make
16. Whistleblower Protection Act of 1987: Hearing on S. 508 Before the Subcomm. on
Fed. Servs., Post Office & Civil Serv. of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 100th Cong.
3 (1987) [hereinafter Hearing on the Whistleblower Protection Act] (statement of Sen. Carl
Levin, Member, S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs).
17. Id.
18. Menell, supra note 9, at 40–41.
19. Jason Zuckerman, SEC Whistleblower Protections: Dodd-Frank and Sarbanes Oxley
Prohibitions Against Retaliation, NAT’L L. REV. (Aug. 21, 2018), https://
www.natlawreview.com/article/sec-whistleblower-protections-dodd-frank-and-sarbanesoxley-prohibitions-against [https://perma.cc/BP69-6CX9]; see, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)–
(9) (2018); 5 U.S.C. § 7211 (2018); 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2018).
20. See Hearing on the Whistleblower Protection Act, supra note 16, at 6 (statement of
Sen. Charles Grassley) (noting that the Whistleblower Protection Act was much needed
considering “the Administration [was] seemingly engaged in a multiple thrust attack on all
fronts against whistleblowing”).
21. Id.
22. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 440–41 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting); see William
Dorsey, An Overview of Whistleblower Protection Claims at the United States Department of
Labor, 26 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 43, 48–55 (2006) (listing the whistleblower
provisions that are administered by the Department of Labor).
23. See U.S CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
government for a redress of grievances.”).
24. Daniel L. Hudson Jr., Balancing Act: Public Employees and Free Speech, FIRST REP.,
Dec. 2002, at 1, 2.
25. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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certain statements outweigh the legitimate interests of their employers in
maintaining operational efficiency.26 In Pickering, the Court’s balancing of
the competing interests favored the employee.27 Critically, the interest in
allowing the employee to speak was considered “as much the public’s interest
in receiving informed opinion as it is the employee’s own right to disseminate
it.”28
While Pickering placed great value on the role of whistleblowing in
preserving our most important democratic values, subsequent decisions
shifted the test in favor of employers.29 In Connick v. Myers,30 the Court
modified Pickering by requiring that an employee’s speech touch upon a
“matter of public concern” before scrutinizing his or her employer’s
actions.31 Rejecting the basic premise that it was sufficient for speech to fall
“generally within the realm of matters of public concern” to engage in
balancing the competing interests,32 Connick required preliminary
examination of the “content, form, and context of a given statement.”33
Because the term “matter of public concern” is a chameleon with as many
meanings as there are people, lower courts have taken divergent, “sometimes
irreconcilable,” approaches towards determining what qualifies.34
Afterwards, in Garcetti v. Ceballos,35 the Court mandated yet another
threshold determination by requiring that an employee speak “as a citizen”
rather than as an “employee” to receive First Amendment protection.36 Over
the objections of three dissents, the majority held that employee speech was
unprotectable when spoken “pursuant to their professional duties.”37 The
decision remains highly controversial.38
26. Id. at 568. Pickering is the “starting point” of any legal analysis related to a public
employee’s right to criticize government or agency policy. ROBERT M. O’NEIL, THE RIGHTS
OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 34 (Norman Dorsen ed., 2d ed. 1993).
27. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574–75.
28. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (per curiam).
29. Pengtian Ma, Public Employee Speech and Public Concern: A Critique of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s Threshold Approach to Public Employee Speech Cases, 30 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 121, 125 (1996); Marni M. Zack, Note, Public Employee Free Speech: The Policy
Reasons for Rejecting a Per Se Rule Precluding Speech Rights, 46 B.C. L. REV. 893, 909
(2005).
30. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
31. Id. at 146.
32. Stephen Allred, From Connick to Confusion: The Struggle to Define Speech on
Matters of Public Concern, 64 IND. L. REV. 43, 48 (1988).
33. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48.
34. Ma, supra note 29, at 132. Even results in the same court, decided in close proximity,
can seem inconsistent. Compare Butler v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 920 F.3d 651, 663 (10th Cir.
2019) (holding that speech made while testifying as a character witness in a child custody
hearing did not relate to a matter of public concern), with Bailey v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 69,
896 F.3d 1176, 1181–82 (10th Cir. 2018) (finding that letters sent on behalf of a criminal
defendant prior to his sentencing did touch on matters of public concern).
35. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
36. Id. at 418.
37. Id. at 426.
38. See John E. Rumel, Public Employee Speech: Answering the Unanswered and
Related Questions in Lane v. Franks, 34 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 243, 246 (2017) (arguing
that “Garcetti should be overruled forthwith”); Elizabeth M. Ellis, Note, Garcetti v. Ceballos:
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Despite these employer-friendly alterations, Pickering’s focus on society’s
interest in hearing from public employees on matters of grave importance
resonates with the justifications offered for whistleblower protections in
Although Pickering covers far more speech than
general.39
whistleblowing,40 the interest in improving public discourse elevated public
employee speech into the echelons of protected expression.41 Accordingly,
Connick’s “public concern” test should be understood primarily as protecting
speech that furthers this public interest.42 Viewed through this lens, Connick
would predominantly shield speech with political43 or academic44 content.
To better serve this purpose, modifying the current Pickering framework
may be necessary.45 In particular, Garcetti’s requirement to speak “as a
citizen” is a major obstacle for whistleblowers to overcome.46 As Justice
David Souter recognized, whether or not an employee speaks in his or her
official capacity need not be dispositive.47 Unlike his suggestion to include
the Garcetti inquiry as part of Pickering’s balancing of interests, another
possibility would be to consider it in tandem with Connick’s “public
concern” test.48
Part I of this Note discusses how courts analyze public employee free
speech claims with an emphasis on Connick’s public concern inquiry, the
ideological core of the standard. Part II explains the difficulties of finding
an appropriate balance between protecting whistleblowers and governmental
autonomy. Finally, Part III will attempt to reinterpret the Pickering standard
to strike the appropriate balance.
I. THE STRUGGLE TO PROTECT WHISTLEBLOWERS
Threats of employment consequences are powerful deterrents against
employees speaking out with damaging information.49 As previously

Public Employees Left to Decide “Your Conscience or Your Job,” 41 IND. L. REV. 187, 208–
13 (2008) (elaborating on various policy concerns that Garcetti may inhibit).
39. Compare Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571–72 (1968), with Hearing on
the Whistleblower Protection Act, supra note 16, at 6 (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 477 (1995)
(nullifying a ban on public employees accepting honoraria as compensation for their
expressive works); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 381–82 (1987) (involving statements
expressing negative opinions about the president).
41. Before this, courts had accepted that public employees surrendered their right to speak
freely as a condition of employment. See McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517,
517–18 (Mass. 1892).
42. See infra Part III.A.
43. See infra Part I.E.1.a.
44. See infra Part I.E.1.b.
45. See infra Part III.B
46. See Oluwole, supra note 5, at 349; Rumel, supra note 38, at 244–46; Darryn Cathryn
Beckstrom, Note, Reconciling the Public Employee Speech Doctrine and Academic Speech
After Garcetti v. Ceballos, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1202, 1223 (2010).
47. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 430 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting).
48. See infra Part III.B.
49. Rodric B. Schoen, Pickering Plus Thirty Years: Public Employees and Free Speech,
30 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 5, 9 (1999).
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mentioned, the First Amendment’s prohibition on actions “abridging”
freedom of expression provides public employees with an extra measure of
protection as compared with private sector employees.50
Part I discusses the necessary legal background concerning the
development of constitutional whistleblower protections. Part I.A briefly
distinguishes public and private employment. Part I.B addresses some of the
judiciary’s initial interpretations of free speech. Part I.C explains the
Supreme Court’s public employee free speech standard and the interests
underpinning the Pickering decision. Part I.D traces the evolution of the
modern standard used to analyze these claims. Finally, Part I.E elaborates
on the “matter of public concern” prong articulated in Connick.
A. Public and Private Employees
Throughout U.S. history, a crucial aspect of economic liberty has been the
right to contract the terms of one’s own employment.51 Granting individuals
the means to set out the terms of their own obligations through contracts is
credited as an essential element of modern, market-based economies.52 Prior
to the Great Depression, freedom of contract was considered so sacred that
the Supreme Court invoked it to strike down New York’s attempt to regulate
working hours for bakers in the now infamous Lochner v. New York53
decision.54 Nevertheless, while a lack of government oversight in the
employer-employee relationship may provide some freedom, the typical
power imbalance between the parties can leave the individual employee with
little room to negotiate.55
The Lochner era’s abhorrence for any government intrusion into
employment arrangements has subsided, but freedom of contract remains
deeply ingrained in American labor relations.56 Even today, private
employment relationships are presumed to be “at will” in nearly every
American jurisdiction.57 Under this arrangement, employers are free to

50. U.S. CONST. amend. I. In addition to federal and state whistleblower statutes, many
jurisdictions now recognize a tort for “wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.”
RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 5.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2015). For a more in-depth discussion,
see generally Joseph R. Grodin et al., Working Group on Chapter 4 of the Proposed
Restatement of Employment Law: The Tort of Wrongful Discipline in Violation of Public
Policy, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 159 (2009).
51. Matthew O. Tobriner & Joseph R. Grodin, The Individual and the Public Service
Enterprise in the New Industrial State, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1247, 1251 (1967).
52. Id.; David. P. Weber, Restricting the Freedom of Contract: A Fundamental
Prohibition, 16 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 51, 52 (2013).
53. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
54. Id. at 57–58.
55. See Tobriner & Grodin, supra note 51, at 1252.
56. Weber, supra note 52, at 52.
57. At-Will Employment Overview, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Apr. 15, 2008),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/at-will-employment-overview.aspx
[https://perma.cc/SF2X-CVYV]. The exception is Montana, which requires “good cause” to
discharge an employee. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(b) (2020).
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terminate employment for any reason except those made expressly illegal.58
By contrast, public sector employees can generally only be disciplined for
adequate “cause.”59
Since the New Deal, public and private employment have also seen
divergent developments in other respects.60 It is still a crime for federal
employees to strike.61 Even allowing public employees to unionize
continues to be controversial.62 Giving unions disproportionate influence
over public policy is seen as undemocratic,63 and some believe that
unionization can impede government functioning in time-sensitive areas like
national security.64 Compensation rates between public and private sectors
also differ because public employee salaries are tied to legislative action
while the private sector is subject only to the market’s whims, for better or
worse.65 As a result, ever-changing policy initiatives can have drastic effects
on the workers charged with implementing those policies.66 Public
employees often become hostages of the divisive political process.67
In exchange, government jobs have traditionally offered superior
retirement benefits and job security.68 Furthermore, the civil service systems
prevent managers from arbitrarily exercising their power to discipline
employees.69 The Bill of Rights, a restraint on the government, does not
apply to private entities.70

58. Union Labor Hosp. Ass’n v. Vance Redwood Lumber Co., 112 P. 886, 888 (Cal.
1910). Congress has passed legislation prohibiting discharge on account of the individual’s
“race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2018).
59. 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (2018); Christopher Raines, Public Sector vs. Private Sector
Employee Rights, CHRON (Mar. 6, 2019), https://smallbusiness.chron.com/private-sector-vspublic-sector-employee-rights-47957.html [https://perma.cc/74JJ-4RYN].
60. The National Labor Relations Act specifically excluded “the United States . . . or any
State or political subdivision thereof” from its definition of “employer.” 29 U.S.C. § 152
(2018).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 1918(3) (2018).
62. Martin H. Malin, The Paradox of Public Sector Labor Law, 84 IND. L.J. 1369, 1369
(2009).
63. Id. at 1372; see Commonwealth v. Cty. Bd., 232 S.E.2d 30, 41 (Va. 1977) (holding
that a local government was powerless to enter into collective bargaining agreements).
64. Malin, supra note 62, at 1375.
65. See Harry H. Wellington & Ralph K. Winter, Jr., The Limits of Collective Bargaining
in Public Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107, 1117 (1969).
66. Compare Exec. Order No. 12,871, 3 C.F.R. § 655 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5
U.S.C. § 7101 (2018) (resolving to improve the efficiency of government agencies), with
Exec. Order No. 13,203, 3 C.F.R. § 781 (2002), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 7101
(2018) (revoking Executive Order 12,871).
67. See, e.g., Jonathan Allen, Will Trump Shut Down the Government to Fight
Impeachment?, NBC NEWS (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politicsnews/will-trump-shut-down-government-fight-impeachment-n1070106
[https://perma.cc/
9QLR-44XR].
68. These advantages may erode as the private sector responds to market demands. See
Wellington & Winter, supra note 65, at 1117.
69. Id.
70. The Bill of Rights secures the rights of U.S. citizens against government actions. See
U.S. CONST. amends. I–X. These protections did not apply to state governments until passage
of the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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B. Early Interpretations of Free Speech
Free speech, a pillar of modern democracy, is among the most enduring
contributions of the Constitution’s framers.71 Notwithstanding its venerable
lineage, the scope and purpose of free speech have been constant sources of
debate among jurists.72 The right to free speech has never been absolute or
unrestrained.73 Like every fundamental right, sufficiently compelling
government interests can overcome an individual’s freedom of expression.74
“The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances . . . that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent.”75 Certain exceptions lack First Amendment
protection entirely, such as obscenities,76 “fighting” words,77 and intentional
falsehoods.78 Such expressions “are of such slight social value” that any
benefits derived from them are “outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality.”79
Limitations on free speech for public employees were especially evident.80
Although the government was restricted in its ability to abridge freedom of
expression when acting as a sovereign, the same restrictions were not
applicable when the government acted as an employer.81 For decades, courts
71. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948)
(recognizing the right to “freedom of opinion and expression”).
72. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(“To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious
evil will result if free speech is practiced.”); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The only difference between expression of an opinion and an
incitement in the narrower sense is the speaker’s enthusiasm for the result.”); Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“It is only the present danger
of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the
expression of opinion . . . .”); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (articulating
the “clear and present danger” standard). But see Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 28 (1971) (arguing for a more limited view
of free speech that covers only “explicitly political” speech).
73. See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (finding that a statute penalizing obstruction of the draft
was constitutional although there were free speech concerns).
74. See, e.g., id. (“The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man
in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.”); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 164–65 (1973) (creating a trimester framework to balance the competing interests of
pregnant mothers and the state); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217–18 (1944)
(authorizing the internment of individuals with Japanese ancestry for national security
purposes), abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
75. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
76. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957). But see Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15, 23 (1971) (overturning a conviction for disturbing the peace when a Vietnam War
protestor wore a shirt containing an expletive while inside a courthouse).
77. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942).
78. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
79. Roth, 354 U.S. at 485 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572).
80. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s holding that a police officer “may have a
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman,” was
long the authoritative view on the subject. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517,
517 (Mass. 1892).
81. See id.; see also Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994) (“[T]he government
as employer indeed has far broader powers than does the government as sovereign.”).
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believed that a public employer was free to manage workers as it pleased and
could “impose any reasonable condition upon holding offices within its
control.”82
C. Pickering and Whistleblowers
Pickering v. Board of Education marked a seismic shift in how courts
evaluate public employees’ free speech claims.83 Marvin Pickering, a public
school teacher, was dismissed after he criticized the school board’s proposal
to raise taxes in a letter sent to a local newspaper editor.84 Although many
of his colleagues agreed with him, most did not publicly show support out of
fear of losing their jobs.85 Lower courts ruled in favor of the school board,
but the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the letter was protected
speech.86 Justice Thurgood Marshall’s majority opinion was rooted in the
public’s need to have “free and unhindered debate on matters of public
importance.”87 He recognized that the public benefits substantially when
those most knowledgeable about governmental institutions are able to speak
freely about them.88
Perhaps cognizant that the Court was breaking with decades of precedent,
Justice Marshall did not believe it was “either appropriate or feasible to
attempt to lay down a general standard” for all public employee speech
claims given the “enormous variety of fact situations” possible.89 However,
he did determine that the crux of the issue was to balance the interests of the
employee, “as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern” with
the state’s interests in efficiently performing public services.90 To do so,
courts should evaluate factors such as the working relationship between the
parties, the speech’s negative effects on the employer, and the nature of the
issue on which the employee spoke.91 Subsequent decisions would clarify
the balancing test further.92

82. McAuliffe, 29 N.E. at 518.
83. See O’NEIL, supra note 26, at 33–34; VAUGHN, supra note 7, at 5.
84. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 566 (1968).
85. See Hudson, supra note 24, at 9.
86. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574–75.
87. Id. at 573.
88. See id. at 572.
89. Id. at 569.
90. Id. at 568. Possible employer rationales for restricting speech include the risks of
increased publicity impeding operations, harm to staff morale, damage to agency credibility,
compromising the employer’s neutrality, or fear of releasing sensitive information. O’NEIL,
supra note 26, at 34.
91. Allred, supra note 32, at 45; see also Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570–71.
92. See Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414 (1979) (holding that
expressing views privately does not forfeit constitutional protection); Mount Healthy City Sch.
Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285–86 (1977) (establishing a defense whereby an
employer can show that they would have made the same decision regardless of the contested
speech); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 598 (1972) (finding that refusing renewal of a
teacher’s employment based on testimony before a legislative committee could be
unconstitutional).
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The nine Supreme Court justices agreed on the result, but Justice Byron
White expressed his dissatisfaction with the new standard in a partial
dissent.93 He saw that the majority drew on elements of defamation law
taken from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,94 which established that
statements on “matters of public concern” could not be subject to defamation
claims unless the plaintiff could show actual malice.95 Thus, Justice White
argued that unless an employee had been “knowingly or recklessly false” in
her statements, it was unnecessary to consider any harm to the employer.96
The majority’s balancing test may have been a concession that, “as an
employer,” the state’s interests in regulating employees are different from its
interests in regulating speech more generally.97
Emanating from the Pickering Court’s decision are two essential values
that the First Amendment protects: the individual employee’s right to
speak98 and the public’s right to hear valuable information on important
issues.99 Until then, the individual’s free speech rights were insufficient
because the prevailing view was that most employees agreed to suspend their
constitutional right of free speech “by the implied terms of [their]
contract.”100 Pickering’s recognition of the public’s right to “free and
unhindered debate on matters of public importance” allowed the Court to
enter uncharted territory.101
Pickering was the first time that the Court recognized constitutional
protections for government whistleblowers.102 Congress has also enacted
various statutory measures to protect whistleblowers based on the public’s
need to hear from industry insiders on important issues like governmental
malfeasance.103 Like private sector employees, public employees alleging
governmental misconduct can turn to these statutes.104

93. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 582–84 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
94. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
95. See id. at 281–82.
96. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 583 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
97. Id. at 568 (majority opinion).
98. See id. (rejecting the notion that teachers may be “compelled to relinquish” First
Amendment rights).
99. Id. at 573.
100. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 518 (Mass. 1892).
101. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 573; see KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1304–06 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 19th ed. 2016).
102. O’NEIL, supra note 26, at 34; VAUGHN, supra note 7, at 5.
103. Dorsey, supra note 22, at 47; see, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)–(9) (2018).
104. One of the better-known whistleblowers of his time was Ernest Fitzgerald, the former
deputy for management systems of the U.S. Air Force who testified before Congress regarding
a massive cost overrun. VAUGHN, supra note 7, at 50. It was later discovered that President
Richard Nixon had said to “get rid of” Fitzgerald on a White House tape recording. Id.
Ironically, Nixon had introduced a bill protecting whistleblowers as a senator nearly two
decades earlier. Id. Fitzgerald’s claim for retaliatory discharge against Nixon was dismissed
when the Supreme Court ruled that the president enjoys “absolute immunity” from damages
arising from official acts. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982).
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D. The Pickering Standard Evolves
In Connick v. Myers, the Supreme Court revisited public employee free
speech doctrine by elaborating on what it meant to speak on matters of public
concern.105 Whereas before there was no separate inquiry into whether or
not to apply the balancing test, here the Court required a preliminary
determination on whether or not the expression touched on such matters.106
Sheila Myers, an assistant district attorney disgruntled with her superior’s
decision to transfer her, circulated a questionnaire among the staff to solicit
their opinions regarding certain office policies.107 She was fired for inciting
what was characterized as a “mini-insurrection” in the office and filed suit,
asserting a free speech violation.108 In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court
held that every question on the survey except for one was unrelated to matters
of public concern based on their “content, form, and context.”109 One
question concerning whether or not employees had been pressured to work
on political campaigns related to a matter of public concern, but the Court
found that the action was nevertheless justified during the balancing stage,
considering the threat to workplace decorum.110 The Court’s decision
characterizes the questionnaire more as a personal grievance than an attempt
to discuss pressing issues.111
Justice William Brennan objected to the majority’s reasoning in a
dissent.112 He disagreed that examining content, form, and context was a
proper method of sifting out speech on matters of public concern.113
According to him, “[u]nconstrained discussion concerning the manner in
which the government performs its duties is an essential element of the public
discourse necessary to informed self-government.”114
The Supreme Court would next breathe life into what it meant to “speak
as a citizen” in Garcetti v. Ceballos.115 Following the lead of multiple
circuits,116 Garcetti held that employees making statements “pursuant to
their official duties” do not speak as citizens—and so the First Amendment
is inapplicable.117 This meant that Richard Ceballos, a deputy district

105. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–49 (1983).
106. Allred, supra note 32, at 47–48.
107. Connick, 461 U.S. at 141.
108. Id. at 151.
109. See id. at 147–48.
110. Id. at 152. The plaintiff disputed the idea that there was any harm to her employer.
See Hudson, supra note 24, at 19.
111. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 154; Schoen, supra note 49, at 19.
112. Connick, 461 U.S. at 156–70 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 159–60. Justice Brennan also asserts that the majority weakens its argument by
stating that some matters may be “inherently of public concern.” Id.
114. Id. at 161.
115. 547 U.S. 410, 422 (2006).
116. See Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2000); Morris v. Crow, 142 F.3d
1379, 1382 (11th Cir. 1998). Both cases found that employees speaking in their official
capacities were unprotected although the Morris court did so as part of the Connick public
concern test. Morris, 142 F.3d at 1382.
117. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
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attorney, was unprotected when he wrote an internal memorandum
recommending the dismissal of an ongoing criminal proceeding.118
Garcetti elicited three separate dissents from Justices John Paul
Stevens,119 David Souter,120 and Stephen Breyer.121 The primary dissent
came from Justice Souter, who suggested an alternative framework where
employees speaking on matters of “unusual importance” could proceed to the
balancing stage even when they were speaking pursuant to their official
duties.122 He argued that the inquiry should not end if an employee spoke in
an official capacity, but that fact should weigh against First Amendment
protection in the Pickering calculus.123 Justice Stevens joined Justice
Souter’s dissent, adding that “[t]he notion that there is a categorical
difference between speaking as a citizen and speaking in the course of one’s
employment is quite wrong.”124 Justice Breyer did not join this dissent
because he felt that this method would not adequately account for
governmental interests.125
This marked yet another major evolution in the Supreme Court’s analysis
Two threshold
of public employee First Amendment claims.126
determinations must be made to fit under the umbrella of free speech: (1) a
public employee must have been speaking as a citizen and (2) that
individual’s speech must have been related to a matter of public concern.127
The analysis only proceeds to the balancing of interests between employer
and employee if both conditions are met.128
The Supreme Court grappled with public employee speech doctrine most
recently in Lane v. Franks,129 which provided an opportunity to expound on
these two threshold inquiries. When Edward Lane, an administrator at a
public university, discovered that a state representative on the school’s
payroll was not attending work, he dismissed her.130 That same
representative was later indicted for mail fraud and theft.131 Subsequently,
Lane was subpoenaed to testify regarding his reasons for firing her at a
criminal trial.132 After the representative was convicted, the university fired
Lane, who alleged that the decision was retaliation for his testimony.133

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Id. at 426–27 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 427–44 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 444–50 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 435 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 434.
Id. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 447–48 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See id. at 418 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id.
134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014).
Id. at 2375.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2376.
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Writing for the Court, Justice Sonia Sotomayor rejected the lower court’s
finding that Lane was speaking as an employee.134 Instead, his speech was
“a quintessential example of speech as a citizen” because of his responsibility
“to the court and society at large, to tell the truth.”135 The Court read Garcetti
narrowly by finding that Lane’s testimony was not part of his official duties
even though he had learned of the misconduct while acting in the scope of
his employment.136
Furthermore, in analyzing the matter of public concern inquiry, the Court
separately evaluated the content, form, and context of Lane’s speech and
found that each supported the employee.137 The Court noted that the content,
statements concerning corruption and misuse of state funds, “obviously
involve[d] a matter of significant public concern.”138 Additionally, the form
and context, which the Court analyzed simultaneously as “sworn testimony
in a judicial proceeding,” had “the formality and gravity necessary” to add
credence to his statements.139 This analysis indicates that the Court viewed
content, form, and context as distinct attributes of speech that could be
However, Lane left numerous questions
analyzed individually.140
unanswered.141
E. Deciphering Matters of Public Concern
Connick requires courts to examine the content, form, and context of
disputed statements on a case-by-case basis when deciding whether the
speech at issue relates to a matter of public concern.142 This procedure has
spawned decisions that run the gamut from highly permissive readings of
public concerns to highly restrictive interpretations.143 Unpredictability
“inevitably chills some protected speech even as it discourages government
officials from acting vigorously against some unprotected speech.”144 The
Fourth Circuit simplified the question as asking whether or not the contested
speech was just a “personal concern,” most often a private grievance.145 This
conceptualization may be accurate in some respects, but it does not capture

134. Id. at 2378.
135. Id. at 2379.
136. See Rumel, supra note 38, at 262.
137. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380.
138. Id.
139. Id. (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 721 (2012) (plurality opinion)).
140. See id.
141. See Rumel, supra note 38, at 246–48 (listing a number of “open questions” after
Lane).
142. See Allred, supra note 32, at 75; supra notes 105–11 and accompanying text.
143. See SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 101, at 1311–14. Compare United States v.
Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 466 (1995) (determining that speeches and articles
written by government workers satisfied Connick), with City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S.
77, 84 (2004) (per curiam) (finding that a police officer’s sale of explicit content was not a
public concern because it “did nothing to inform the public about any aspect of the
[department’s] functioning or operation”).
144. Gonzalez v. Benavides, 774 F.2d 1295, 1303 (5th Cir. 1985).
145. Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 998 (4th Cir. 1985).
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the staggering variety of scenarios that could involve the Pickering test.146
Instead, given Lane’s method of analysis, a more holistic view is needed to
examine content, form, and context in greater detail.147 The following
sections examine each of the Connick factors.
1. Content
The content of speech, namely the ideas that a speaker is expressing,148
involves a matter of public concern if it can be “fairly considered as relating
to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community.”149
Because ideas that a speaker expresses are at the heart of free speech, courts
tend to focus on this one attribute above form and context.150 Not all varieties
of speech are treated the same under the First Amendment.151 Former D.C.
Circuit Judge Robert Bork went so far as to argue that only “[e]xplicitly
political speech” is entitled to First Amendment protection.152 This assertion
was wholly repudiated in Connick itself, which states that “[g]reat secular
causes, with smaller ones, are guarded.”153 Nevertheless, the content of
speech plays a major role in how First Amendment claims are adjudicated,
both in general and as part of the Connick inquiry.154 Content frequently
associated with whistleblowing, primarily political speech, tends to receive
favorable consideration.155
Therefore, this section surveys how courts view various types of speech
that constitute the content prong of Connick, including political speech,

146. See Allred, supra note 32, at 50–75.
147. See Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2380 (2014).
148. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 454 (2011) (“In considering content, form, and
context . . . it is necessary to evaluate all of the circumstances of the speech, including what
was said, where it was said, and how it was said.”). Although a defamation case, the public
concern standard is identical and Connick is cited. Id. at 452–53. The ideas expressed by the
speaker refer to “what was said.” Id. at 454.
149. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).
150. See, e.g., Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380 (analyzing content independently while viewing
form and context together); Butler v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 920 F.3d 651, 663–64 (10th Cir.
2019) (holding that lack of appropriate content was fatal to an employee’s claim despite
favorable form and context); Berger, 779 F.2d at 998 (“The principle that emerges is that all
public employee speech that by content is within the general protection of the first amendment
is entitled to at least qualified protection against public employer chilling action . . . .”).
151. Political speech in particular “is central to the meaning and purpose of the First
Amendment.” See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 329 (2010).
152. Bork, supra note 72, at 28.
153. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147 (quoting Mine Workers v. Ill. Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 223
(1967)). Bork himself would later recognize other types of speech as protected. Johnathan H.
Adler, Robert Bork & Commercial Speech, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 615, 616–17 (2014); see
FTC v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 F.2d 35, 43 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J.)
(recognizing commercial speech as protected).
154. See, e.g., City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84 (2004) (per curiam) (refusing to
recognize a police officer’s sale of lewd videotapes as protected speech); Berry v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 447 F.3d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 2006) (applying Pickering balancing to a religious
exercise case, but also analyzing certain religious expression under a public forum analysis).
155. See infra Part I.E.1.a. Academic speech, although not as directly tied to
whistleblowing, implicates similar interests. See infra Part I.E.1.b.
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academic speech, speech on personal concerns, and some other types of
speech that do not directly relate to whistleblower activity.
a. Political Speech
Political speech refers to expressions “concerned with governmental
behavior, policy or personnel.”156 Unsurprisingly, many cases brought by
government employees relate to political issues.157 Such speech is highly
likely to be of substantial interest and value to society.158
Rankin v. McPherson159 demonstrates the considerable weight given to
political statements. Upon hearing of an assassination attempt on President
Ronald Reagan, deputy constable Ardith McPherson said to a coworker, “If
they go for him again, I hope they get him.”160 Writing for the majority,
Justice Marshall found that her remark about the president “plainly dealt with
a matter of public concern”161 and that the “inappropriate or controversial
character of a statement is irrelevant.”162 Dissenting, Justice Antonin Scalia
was incensed, saying that this permitted employees to openly “ride with the
cops and cheer for the robbers” without fear of retribution.163 He saw the
expression as “violent words” that would not warrant First Amendment
protection.164 Justice Lewis Powell cast the tiebreaking vote and found the
statement was protected speech.165 However, he wrote separately that he
believed it was unnecessary to apply the full Pickering analysis to private
speech unrelated to an employee’s job.166 The justices’ disagreements were
centered on how to classify the statement, as even the dissent seemed to
concede that a political statement would weigh in favor of the employee.167
McPherson also emphasized that a court’s determination on the public
concern test often hinges on how the factfinder characterizes the contested
speech.168 Occasionally, these characterizations turn on the speaker’s

156. Bork, supra note 72, at 27.
157. Most of the categories that Professor Stephen Allred identified could be considered
more specific types of political speech, such as speech related to current community debates,
abuse of office, public safety, public education, or discriminatory government practices. See
Allred, supra note 32, at 50–68.
158. See Roe, 543 U.S. at 84.
159. 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
160. Id. at 380.
161. Id. at 386.
162. Id. at 387.
163. Id. at 394 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 396.
165. Id. at 393 (Powell, J., concurring).
166. Justice Powell believed that “it will be an unusual case” where an employer’s interests
could justify punishment for such private speech. Id. As he agreed that the statement touched
on matters of public concern, he would not have even engaged in the balancing test, unlike
Justice Marshall. See id.
167. See id. at 396 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia instead accused the majority of
conflating the speaker’s motive with the content of her speech to transform the statement into
political commentary. Id. at 396–97.
168. See Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 998 (4th Cir. 1985).
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perceived motive.169 Expressions that a court finds to be genuine statements
about political issues tend to succeed, while speech motivated by more
personal reasons will likely fail.170 However, not everyone considers it
appropriate to consider motive at this stage.171 Doing so is also inconsistent
with statutory whistleblower protections, which disregard why a
whistleblower chooses to speak.172
b. Academic Speech
Academic freedom developed out of the McCarthy era, when government
officials sought to test the loyalty of university professors and expose alleged
dissidents.173 In Sweezy v. New Hampshire174 and Keyishian v. Board of
Regents,175 the Supreme Court established that academic freedom was “a
special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that
cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.”176 Educators and students must
have the freedom to learn unimpeded, “otherwise our civilization will
stagnate and die.”177 The precise contours of academic freedom are
unclear,178 but public universities are indisputably a “marketplace of
ideas,”179 which “occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition.”180
169. Professor Rodric Schoen viewed motive in conjunction with context. Schoen, supra
note 49, at 18–19. However, because motive appears to influence how courts interpret the
ideas that a speaker expresses, this Note will consider motive alongside content.
170. Compare Ohse v. Hughes, 816 F.2d 1144, 1152 (7th Cir. 1987) (distinguishing the
facts from Connick), and Czurlanis v. Albanese, 721 F.2d 98, 104 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that
“the motivations underlying Czurlanis’ [speech]” aligned with the content as falling within
“core public speech”), with Lipsey v. Chi. Cook Cty. Criminal Justice Comm’n, 638 F. Supp.
837, 842 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (rejecting a racial discrimination complaint as a personal dispute
rather than a statement about office policy), and Johnson v. Orr, 617 F. Supp. 170, 176 (E.D.
Cal. 1985) (finding that a service member’s letter revealing her sexual orientation to her
commanding officer was a personal matter rather than advocacy).
171. See Rankin, 483 U.S. at 397 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (equating transforming motive into
content with “viewing a political assassination preceded by a harangue as nothing more than
a strong denunciation of the victim’s political views”); Hubbard v. EPA, 949 F.2d 453, 457
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (“Hubbard’s motivation, unless personal, is irrelevant to whether the speech
itself is a matter of public concern.”).
172. Dorsey, supra note 22, at 78. Congress providing monetary incentives for
whistleblowers is strong evidence that a whistleblower’s motive in coming forward is not a
relevant consideration. See Hearing on the Whistleblower Protection Act, supra note 16, at 6
(statement of Sen. Charles Grassley).
173. See David M. Rabban, Academic Freedom, Individual or Institutional?, ACADEME,
Nov.–Dec. 2001, at 16, 17.
174. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
175. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
176. Id. at 603.
177. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250.
178. See Rabban, supra note 173, at 17–20 (explaining the debate regarding whether
academic freedom is an individual right of professors or an institutional right of universities);
J. Peter Byrne, The Threat to Constitutional Academic Freedom, 31 J.C. & U.L. 79, 139–40
(2004) (arguing that “colleges and universities have a distinct approach to speech that deserves
reasonable deference from society at large.”).
179. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603; see Beckstrom, supra note 46, at 1202 (describing public
universities as the “quintessential marketplace of ideas”).
180. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003).
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Neither students nor teachers “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”181
Considering academic speech under the Connick inquiry, “the whole
justification for academic freedom is that the professional speech of
professors does concern the public.”182 “Scholarship cannot flourish in an
atmosphere of suspicion and distrust” and the threat of employment
consequences would “impose [a] strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in
our colleges and universities.”183 Congress has acknowledged the immense
public benefits of protecting academic speech in all institutes of higher
learning by codifying the fair use defense to copyright infringement, carving
out exceptions for “teaching . . . scholarship, or research.”184 Like much of
copyright law, fair use is meant as a means of encouraging the creation of
works that are of benefit to society.185
Therefore, justifications for protecting academic speech are substantially
similar to the rationale behind Pickering and whistleblower statutes in
general.186 The driving force behind all this is that society benefits
tremendously if certain individuals are able to speak freely.187 Thus, like
political speech, academic speech should favor employees under the public
concern test.188 Uncertainty arises when courts refuse to view academics
speaking outside of their teaching and scholarship duties as academic
speech.189 Speech that fosters learning may be protected, but expressions
related to internal operations often are not.190
c. Personal Speech
Speech with purely personal content does not relate to matters of public
concern and such expressions will typically fail to clear the Connick
181. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
182. Byrne, supra note 178, at 112.
183. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
184. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018).
185. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1107 (1990).
186. See supra notes 98–104 and accompanying text.
187. Compare Byrne, supra note 178, at 112, with Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,
572 (1968), and Menell, supra note 9, at 18.
188. In his Garcetti dissent, Justice Souter expresses concern that the majority’s citizen
speech requirement will endanger academic freedoms. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410,
438–39 (2006) (Souter J., dissenting). The majority responds to his concerns by
acknowledging that such expressions may involve “additional constitutional interests that are
not fully accounted for” by their analysis, but it refuses to address that point further. Id. at 425
(majority opinion).
189. Beckstrom, supra note 46, at 1223; see, e.g., Colburn v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 973 F.2d
581, 588 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that complaints centered on how faculty at Indiana
University were evaluated touched on only “matters of personal interest” even though the
plaintiffs “had good reason to be concerned given the mounting hostility in the department”);
Hong v. Grant, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1169 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (holding that comments regarding
faculty performance reviews, departmental staffing, and faculty hiring were not public
concerns).
190. See Hong, 516 F. Supp. 2d at 1169 (“[I]nternal administrative disputes . . . have little
or no relevance to the community as a whole.”).
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threshold.191 This includes speech that may seem to implicate public issues
but is instead found to be an extension of personal grievances.192 Complaints
about internal operations are unprotected unless there are public interests at
stake.193 It is still unclear if speech with purely personal content can still
satisfy the Connick inquiry on form and context alone,194 but lacking in this
area severely harms the employee’s chances of success.195 These employees
may have to pursue other avenues for relief, such as whistleblower statutes,
tort law,196 or even possibly state constitutional protections.197
d. Other Types of Speech
As Pickering acknowledges, there are innumerable scenarios that could
form the basis for employee discipline.198 Nevertheless, not all topics
implicate the public’s interest in free and unhindered debate even though they
may have great personal significance.199 Other types of expressions such as
religious, commercial, or artistic speech are unlikely to implicate the interests

191. Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 998 (4th Cir. 1985); see Allred, supra note 32, at
72.
192. See, e.g., Wales v. Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 82, 85 (7th Cir. 1997) (determining that a
teacher’s memorandum was more of a private concern than a public one, “even though it has
elements of both”); Alinovi v. Worcester Sch. Comm., 777 F.2d 776, 787 (1st Cir. 1985)
(ruling that a teacher publicly posting letters she received from the school administration was
an attempt to resolve her own disciplinary proceedings); Day v. S. Park Indep. Sch. Dist., 768
F.2d 696, 700 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding that a teacher’s complaint regarding her performance
evaluation was a personal matter); Singh v. Lamar Univ., 635 F. Supp. 737, 740 (E.D. Tex.
1986) (holding that the plaintiff’s complaint related to “individual interests, desires, disputes
and grievances”); Cook v. Ashmore, 579 F. Supp. 78, 84 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (finding that
contested speech pertained to an employee’s grievance over the amount of advance notice he
received prior to his discipline, which was “clearly” a matter of personal concern).
193. Compare Murray v. Gardner, 741 F.2d 434, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“[T]he role of the
whistle-blower merits protection; the expressions of personal dissatisfaction by a discontented
employee do not.”), and Luck v. Mazzone, 52 F.3d 475, 477 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming that a
note sent to a radio station about the lack of air conditioning in the building where the
employee worked was not a public concern), with Egger v. Phillips, 710 F.2d 292, 317 (7th
Cir. 1983) (raising issues related to the integrity of law enforcement officials was a substantial
public concern).
194. See Rumel, supra note 38, at 285.
195. In Butler v. Board of County Commissioners, the Tenth Circuit ruled against the
plaintiff on the public concern inquiry despite highly favorable form and context. 920 F.3d
651, 663–64 (10th Cir. 2019).
196. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 5.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
197. The U.S. Constitution sets the lower bound of free speech protection rather than the
limit. Joseph R. Grodin, The California Supreme Court and State Constitutional Rights: The
Early Years, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 141, 161 (2004). State constitutions can contain
independent free expression provisions, which may be more expansive. See Shirley S.
Abrahamson, Divided We Stand: State Constitutions in a More Perfect Union, 18 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 723, 734–39 (1991). State courts are often hesitant to read their own constitutions
more broadly than the U.S. Supreme Court reads the federal constitution, but some have. Id.
at 724.
198. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569 (1968).
199. See supra Part I.E.1.c.
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of informing the public and, thus, do not often satisfy the public concern
inquiry.200
To date, the Supreme Court has not analyzed a case involving the free
exercise of religion201 under the Pickering standard.202 Some lower courts
have nonetheless imported the Pickering balancing test when government
employees have alleged that their employer infringed on their free exercise
rights.203 The Establishment Clause204 complicates the analysis because the
government is obligated to avoid taking actions that endorse a particular
religion.205 Importantly, application of Pickering has been limited to the
final balancing inquiry; there is no separate consideration as to whether the
religious exercise related to a matter of public concern.206 The balancing test
is a useful analytical tool, but as the considerations implicated in religious
exercise cases are significantly different from those articulated in Pickering,
applying the entire standard would be inappropriate.207
Restrictions on commercial activity or commercial speech208 are likewise
infrequently analyzed under the Pickering test. However, the Supreme Court
did so in United States v. National Treasury Employees Union.209 There, a
class of unions and civil servants alleged that banning executive branch
employees from receiving compensation for writing or speaking on various
topics was unconstitutional.210 The Court concluded that this was a matter
of public concern, but the case was unusual because it dealt with a preemptive
restriction on the speech of thousands of workers rather than an individual.211
200. This is not an exhaustive list of other types of content for particular expressions; these
examples simply illustrate that political and academic speech add to public discourse in a way
that many expressions will not. See supra notes 99–104 and accompanying text.
201. The Free Exercise Clause mandates that Congress cannot make any law “prohibiting
the free exercise [of religion].” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
202. Brian Richards, Note, The Boundaries of Religious Speech in the Government
Workplace, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 745, 748 (1998); Chaz Weber, Note, Picking on
Pickering: Proposing Intermediate Scrutiny in Public-Employment Religious-Speech Cases
via Berry v. Department of Social Services, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 513, 530–31 (2008).
203. See, e.g., Berry v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 447 F.3d 642, 648–50 (9th Cir. 2006); Shahar
v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1103 (11th Cir. 1997); Brown v. Polk County, 61 F.3d 650, 658
(8th Cir. 1995).
204. See U.S CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion . . . .”).
205. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (explaining the criteria used to
analyze claims of Establishment Clause violations).
206. See Brown, 61 F.3d at 658–59 (balancing the competing interests between the
Establishment Clause and Free Exercise rights without any mention of Connick).
207. Neither interest identified in Pickering, an individual’s right to free speech and
society’s interest in improving public discourse, is implicated by an individual’s free exercise
of religion. See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text.
208. Commercial speech has been defined as “speech proposing a commercial transaction”
for “the economic interests of the speaker.” Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561–62 (1980); see David F. McGowan, Comment, A Critical
Analysis of Commercial Speech, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 359, 383 (1990). Advertising is the most
recognizable form of commercial speech. See FTC v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
778 F.2d 35, 43 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (discussing allowable restrictions on tobacco advertising).
209. 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
210. Id. at 461.
211. See id. at 466.
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Commercial speech may involve expressions that would be covered under
the First Amendment “if it were freestanding.”212 Thus, to the extent the
expression “alludes to, or touches on, matters of collective or public interest
to the society and engages the interest of members of the audience in
considering such matters,” it could satisfy a Connick analysis.213 Such a
broad ban on potential commercial speech would likely stifle at least some
speech that informed the public, even if most government employees’
individual economic activity would not receive protection.214
In rare circumstances, artistic speech may also touch on matters of public
concern, as demonstrated by Berger v. Battaglia.215 The Fourth Circuit
determined that a police officer’s public musical performance while wearing
blackface constituted protected speech, immunizing him from discipline.216
Curiously, this was the opposite of a whistleblower situation because public
backlash to an employee’s speech prompted the employer’s decision.217
Unquestionably, the content of the employee’s speech was artistic, but it also
spoke to racial issues within the Baltimore Police Department, something of
great concern to the community.218 This is likely an exceptional case
because, generally, artistic expression is not guarded as closely as other types
of expression previously identified.219 Still, this demonstrates the flexibility
that Pickering and Connick sought to achieve.220 Courts repeatedly state
their intention to avoid defining art or judging its merits.221 To the extent
that artistic expressions touch on matters of public concern, they may satisfy
the Connick threshold. But more often, they would be considered matters of
personal concern for the individual, like religious exercise or commercial
activity.222

212. Victor Brudney, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 53 B.C. L. REV.
1153, 1157 (2012).
213. Id. at 1176.
214. See, e.g., City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84 (2004) (per curiam) (concluding
that a policeman’s sale of explicit content was “not a close case” as the Court ruled
unanimously that it did not touch upon matters of public concern).
215. 779 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1985).
216. Id. at 1002.
217. See id. at 997.
218. See id. at 995 (recounting that the NAACP had protested this employee’s
performance).
219. See id. at 999 (“We do not disagree with the general assessment that entertainment
ranks lower on the scale of first amendment values than does pure political debate.”); see also
supra Part I.E.1.a.
220. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,
569 (1968).
221. Christine Haight Farley, Judging Art, 79 TUL. L. REV. 805, 807 (2005); see Bleistein
v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (“It would be a dangerous
undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the
worth of pictorial illustrations . . . .”).
222. See supra notes 201–14 and accompanying text.
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2. Form
Form receives far less attention than content; if mentioned at all, it is
typically disposed of quickly.223 The most accurate description of form is
“how” the speaker expresses herself.224 Individuals are capable of
expressing themselves in a nearly infinite number of ways, but broad
categories emerge.
Three political patronage cases have established when public employees
may be removed because of their associations with particular groups.225
Elrod v. Burns,226 Branti v. Finkel,227 and Rutan v. Republican Party of
Illinois228 have forbidden employers to retaliate against employees for their
association with political groups.229 Such cases are related to Pickering but
utilize a different analysis.230
The public concern inquiry frequently examines verbal expressions.231
Utterances spoken with more “formality and gravity” are more likely to
influence public discourse and are weighed favorably for employees.232
Nevertheless, statements made in private may still be protected.233 Failing
to protect private disclosures would encourage employees to voice concerns
overtly rather than addressing them more discreetly, a scenario that publicitywary employers would wish to avoid.234
The same philosophy applies to written expressions, the other common
form of employee speech examined under Connick.235 Expressions made in
a manner that can effectively inform the public are favored but not
223. See, e.g., Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2380 (2014) (discussing form alongside
context); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 386–87 (1987) (failing to analyze form at all).
224. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 454 (2011) (noting that, in evaluating the content,
form, and context of speech, “how it was said” is a relevant consideration).
225. Hudson, supra note 24, at 33.
226. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
227. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
228. 497 U.S. 62 (1990).
229. This protection does not extend to individuals who occupy “policymaking positions.”
Elrod, 427 U.S. at 372; Hudson, supra note 24, at 34.
230. See Branti, 445 U.S. at 518 (“[T]he question is whether the hiring authority can
demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance
of the public office involved.”).
231. See, e.g., Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 679–80 (1994) (ruling that a conversation
between two nurses did not touch on matters of public concern); Rankin v. McPherson, 483
U.S. 378, 386 (1987) (finding that a statement about the president was related to a matter of
public concern); Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 1002 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that a police
officer’s musical performance was constitutionally protected speech).
232. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2380 (2014) (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 567
U.S. 709, 721 (2012) (plurality opinion)).
233. Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414 (1979).
234. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 427 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
235. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 (1983) (explaining that a questionnaire
distributed around the plaintiff’s office must have touched on matters of public concern to be
protected); Bailey v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 69, 896 F.3d 1176, 1181–82 (10th Cir. 2018)
(finding that letters sent in connection with a criminal sentencing proceeding were related to
a matter of public concern); Colburn v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 973 F.2d 581, 586 (7th Cir. 1992)
(“In the present case, the employee speech was in the form of letters addressed to University
officials.”).

2020]

A PUBLIC CONCERN

1565

dispositive.236 Perhaps most crucially, expressions made in a way likely to
disrupt office operations are unlikely to succeed.237 More obscure forms of
expression, like symbolic gestures, do not appear to have been addressed
under this inquiry, but analysis should proceed along similar lines.
3. Context
Context refers to the circumstances under which the contested speech was
made.238 Disentangling context from the other factors can be difficult,239 but
there are some common issues that courts examine.
Whether speech is internal or external to the particular government
employer is pertinent to the inquiry.240 Issues entirely related to internal
affairs are not seen as relevant to the public.241 On the other hand, more
discreet disclosures are less likely to impede office operation or be
considered extensions of personal grievances.242 The external or internal
question is often highly fact intensive and may be considered in tandem with
other details.243
Context also considers whether or not the given speech was truthful.244
Generally, the First Amendment protects true statements but not intentional
falsehoods.245 Nevertheless, misrepresentations made in good faith can still
relate to matters of public concern and receive First Amendment
protection.246
236. Compare Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574–75 (1968) (finding a letter sent
to the editor of a newspaper was protected), with Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 (holding that all
questions except one in an internal questionnaire were not protected speech).
237. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 154. But see Porter v. Califano, 592 F.2d 770, 773–74 (5th
Cir. 1979) (“[I]t would be absurd to hold that the First Amendment generally authorizes
corrupt officials to punish subordinates who blow the whistle simply because the speech
somewhat disrupted the office.”).
238. In Snyder v. Phelps, the Supreme Court appeared to view a statement’s context, at
least partially, as “where it was said.” 562 U.S. 443, 454 (2011). However, the venue appeared
to only be part of context—other circumstances surrounding the contested speech have been
included. See id. at 454–55; see also Rankin v. McPherson 483 U.S. 378, 386–87 (1987)
(giving consideration to the events which precipitated the employee’s comments).
239. See Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2380 (2014) (analyzing form and context together
by considering the two as “sworn testimony in a judicial proceeding”).
240. Compare id., with Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414 (1979)
(finding that an employee expressing views privately does not forfeit their free speech
protection).
241. Hong v. Grant, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1169 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
242. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 427 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting); supra Part
I.E.1.c.
243. Consider Rankin, where the majority determined that an employee’s statement was
not a threat on the president’s life but rather a political statement about a public official
because it was spoken in private with a coworker. 483 U.S. at 386–87. Justice Powell’s
tiebreaking vote was motivated largely by the fact that the comment was part of a private
conversation. See id. at 394 (Powell, J., concurring).
244. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380.
245. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
246. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 582 (1968) (finding that a teacher’s
speech was protected although some of the information he provided was found to be factually
incorrect).
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Finally, certain venues appear to receive special consideration when
evaluating context.247 Public court proceedings in particular carry a great
deal of weight.248 Providing testimony inside a courtroom is a situation
where the public has a heightened interest in allowing individuals to speak
openly.249 The entire legal system depends on witnesses speaking honestly
during such proceedings, and testimony can also serve as a public means of
communicating information.250
II. THE COMPETING INTERESTS AT PLAY
The nature of Pickering’s case-by-case approach to adjudicating First
Amendment protection for public sector employees has produced substantial
uncertainty.251 The same court may reach drastically different results even
on cases decided in close proximity.252 While the standard first announced
in Pickering was intentionally vague so as to accommodate the wide array of
situations where employees could claim free speech violations,253
uncertainty inevitably arises.
The following sections focus on several issues particularly relevant to
public employee whistleblowing under Pickering. Part II.A discusses the
conflicting employee and government interests that the test is meant to
reconcile. Part II.B delves into how the Connick factors are to be weighed in
the public concern inquiry. Part II.C presents the issues that Garcetti now
poses for whistleblowers. Part II.D questions if constitutional protections for
whistleblowers are necessary in light of the whistleblower statutes now in
place.
A. Employee and Employer Interests
Public employees have inside knowledge and are capable of illuminating
the government’s inner workings in ways that could be impossible

247. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 454–455 (2011) (considering that, although a
funeral was a private event, protestors displayed their signs on public land). More generally,
the forum where speech is made can have a major impact on First Amendment analysis. See
Berry v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 447 F.3d 642, 652–54 (9th Cir. 2006) (analyzing certain parts
of an employee’s claim under Pickering and others under a public forum analysis); Weber,
supra note 202, at 530.
248. See, e.g., Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380; Bailey v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 69, 896 F.3d 1176,
1181–82 (10th Cir. 2018).
249. See Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380 (citing United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 721 (2012)
(plurality opinion)).
250. See Rumel, supra note 38, at 291–92.
251. Id. at 246–47 (listing various questions still unanswered after the Lane decision).
252. Compare Butler v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 920 F.3d 651, 663 (10th Cir. 2019)
(concluding that testimony as a character witness in a child custody proceeding was not a
matter of public concern), with Bailey, 896 F.3d at 1181–82 (10th Cir. 2018) (finding that
letters sent in support of an employee’s nephew in a sentencing proceeding related to a matter
of public concern).
253. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569 (1968).
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otherwise.254 Failing to protect employment, a “focal point[] in the lives of
individuals,” deprives society of the benefits of employees’ expertise by
stifling disclosures.255 We rely on whistleblowers, both in the public and
private sectors, to aid law enforcement.256 Senator Grassley has estimated
that whistleblowers have saved the federal government $56 billion since
1986.257
Nonetheless, restricting governmental autonomy to manage staff impedes
efficient operations and threatens to turn every workplace dispute into a
constitutional matter.258 Governmental entities are typically given a great
deal of deference in the areas where they are most knowledgeable.259 Public
employers may have legitimate reasons for regulating employees’ speech.260
For instance, it would be difficult to argue that an employer should be
prohibited from disciplining a police officer or intelligence agent who put
lives at risk by leaking sensitive information.261
B. The Connick Factors
In Lane,262 the Court viewed content, form, and context as discrete
characteristics of speech.263 This made the criteria more explicit but left
questions unanswered.264 Content appears to be the most heavily weighted
factor, but it is unclear whether appropriate content is a necessary condition
to satisfy the public concern threshold.265 From one perspective, because the
content of speech is what actually serves to inform the public, it can be
difficult to see how speech could add to public discourse absent relevant
content.266 Conversely, finding content a necessary condition would make
one factor dispositive, which goes against the Supreme Court’s seemingly
holistic view.267
This problem is most apparent when government employees testify in
judicial proceedings—only to be disciplined later.268 Professor John Rumel
argues that there is such a public interest in ensuring truthful testimony in
judicial proceedings that employees should be protected, even if their
254. See, e.g., Julian E. Barnes et al., Whistle-Blower Complaint Is Said to Involve Trump
and Ukraine, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/19/us/politics/
intelligence-whistle-blower-complaint-trump.html [https://perma.cc/FRQ7-VRFS].
255. Ma, supra note 29, at 128.
256. Menell, supra note 9, at 18.
257. Grassley, supra note 13.
258. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983) (“[G]overnment offices could not
function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter.”).
259. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S 837, 844 (1984).
260. O’NEIL, supra note 26, at 34.
261. Id.
262. See supra notes 129–41 and accompanying text.
263. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2380 (2014).
264. Rumel, supra note 38, at 246.
265. Id. at 247.
266. Id. at 291.
267. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 454 (2011) (“[N]o factor is dispositive.”).
268. See, e.g., Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380; Falco v. Zimmer, 767 F. App’x 288, 309 (3d Cir.
2019); Butler v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 920 F.3d 651, 663–64 (10th Cir. 2019).
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testimony’s content did not relate to matters of public concern.269 Even after
Lane, there is conflict between lower courts regarding how testimony should
be treated under the public concern test.270 Testimony before legislative
bodies like Congress implicates the same concerns and precedent indicates
similar protections.271
On a more fundamental level, merely examining an expression’s content,
form, and context may not be an appropriate analysis for uncovering matters
of public concern.272 In his Connick dissent, Justice Brennan argued that the
inquiry should only ask if the speech “discussed subjects that could
reasonably be expected to be of interest.”273 He asserted that the majority
had seriously restricted what would qualify as a matter of public concern.274
The majority’s position was that Justice Brennan’s more permissive
approach would cause speech about nearly anything transpiring inside a
government office to be sufficient, “plant[ing] the seed of a constitutional
case.”275
Uncertainty regarding how to account for motive further adds to
confusion.276 Some courts use motive to determine if an employee’s
expression is really a personal grievance.277 Others see motive as largely
irrelevant because it has no bearing on the ideas that the speaker is
expressing.278
C. Garcetti’s Citizen Speech Requirement
By imposing a threshold requirement that individuals speak “as a citizen,”
Garcetti279 provides a mechanism for dismissing claims as a matter of law280
269. Rumel, supra note 38, at 292.
270. Id. at 289; see, e.g., Butler, 920 F.3d at 663 (refusing to adopt a rule that testimony in
judicial proceedings is per se a public concern); Stillwell v. City of Williams, 831 F.3d 1234,
1239 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding Connick satisfied if testimony contributed to the resolution of a
proceeding where significant government misconduct was at issue); Moriates v. City of New
York, No. 13-cv-4845 (ENV)(LB), 2016 WL 3566656, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. June 24, 2016)
(rejecting sworn testimony that did not have any relation to a public concern).
271. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 598 (1972).
272. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 159–60 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
273. Id. at 163.
274. Id. at 158; Allred, supra note 32, at 49.
275. Connick, 461 U.S. at 149 (majority opinion).
276. See Ma, supra note 29, at 133; Schoen, supra note 49, at 17.
277. See, e.g., Falco v. Zimmer, 767 F. App’x 288, 302 (3d Cir. 2019) (asserting that
Connick “encompasses” the speaker’s motive); Kock v. City of Hutchinson, 847 F.2d 1436,
1447 (10th Cir. 1988) (finding that motive did not “transform his speech into speech on a
matter of public concern”); Murray v. Gardner, 741 F.2d 434, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“[T]he
part of a ‘good government’ partisan is no doubt very attractive as the last refuge of the
incompetent or discontented.”).
278. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483, U.S. 378, 397 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Hubbard
v. EPA, 949 F.2d 453, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Ma, supra note 29, at 133.
279. See supra notes 115–25 and accompanying text.
280. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 436 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the majority incorrectly found that statements made within the scope of employment
should be differentiated “as a matter of law” from protected statements). The public concern
inquiry is also a question of law. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.7.
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before fact-intensive Pickering balancing.281 The Garcetti decision has been
criticized as chilling valuable speech.282 It also produces counterintuitive
results such as incentivizing employees to “voice their concerns publicly
before talking frankly to their supervisors.”283 Furthermore, because
Pickering already took the parties’ “working relationship” into account
during balancing, the examination is partially redundant.284
On the other hand, employers have “heightened interests in controlling
speech made by an employee in [their] professional capacity.”285 When
employees speak in an official capacity, they represent their employers and
the government has a legitimate interest in maintaining “consistency and
clarity” in their messaging.286 Like all employers, the government needs to
exert a substantial degree of control over its employees.287 Public employees
may “contravene governmental policies” when they speak out of turn.288
D. The Need for Constitutional Protections
The Garcetti majority partially justified its decision by pointing out the
numerous federal and state whistleblower provisions which can serve to
shield whistleblowers.289 Indeed, it could be argued that First Amendment
protections are no longer necessary in light of all these other protective
measures.290
However, as Justice Souter’s dissent points out, statutory whistleblower
provisions can fall short of assuring employees that their courage will be
vindicated.291 Congress often tailors statutes to combat contemporary
concerns, an approach which sometimes leaves gaps in protection.292 The
result is a patchwork of rules that can be difficult for legal experts to wade
through, let alone those who need to avail themselves of these protections.293

281. Schoen, supra note 49, at 20.
282. See Rumel, supra note 38, at 244–46; Ellis, supra note 38, at 210; Zack, supra note
29, at 909.
283. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
284. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 566, 570 (1968); Allred, supra note 32, at 45.
285. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422 (majority opinion).
286. Id.
287. Id. at 418.
288. Id. at 419.
289. Id. at 425; see Dorsey, supra note 22, at 48–51 (listing various whistleblower statutes
that the Department of Labor administers).
290. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425–26.
291. Id. at 440–41 (Souter, J., dissenting); see Connor Berkebile, Note, The Puzzle of
Whistleblower Protection Legislation: Assembling the Piecemeal, 28 IND. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 1, 21 (2018).
292. To illustrate this, Congress created a public policy exception for whistleblowers
accused of misappropriating trade secrets in the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016. Menell,
supra note 9, at 2. This was too late for Mary Cafasso, who disclosed evidence of what she
believed was her employer’s illegal activity and was ordered to pay damages and attorney’s
fees when her employer counterclaimed for breach of their confidentiality agreement. See
Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., 637 F.3d 1047, 1061–63 (9th Cir. 2011).
293. See Dorsey, supra note 22, at 48–49 (tallying eight separate whistleblower provisions
in the environmental area alone).
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With all this uncertainty, combined with traditional deterrents, it may be
surprising that anyone comes forward at all.294
III. BRIDGING THE DIVIDE
To harmonize various conflicts with the modern Pickering standard, it is
necessary to reiterate that the driving force behind the original decision was
the idea that certain individuals’ speech better informs the public on
important topics.295 Even though Connick and Garcetti have placed barriers
to constitutional protection, this guiding principle can ensure that public
employees, and particularly whistleblowers, receive free speech protection
when warranted.
This Part argues that, by focusing on this interest in public discourse, the
modern Pickering standard can be adapted to better serve its original purpose.
Part III.A focuses on clarifying Connick’s public concern test. Part III.B
proposes a means of modifying Garcetti so as to better accommodate this
interest. Lastly, Part III.C argues that constitutional protections for public
employees are still needed despite the various other statutory protections in
place.
A. Understanding Connick
The Supreme Court’s “fuzzy” standards have caused contradictory and
conflicting results regarding the public concern inquiry in lower courts.296
Nevertheless, protections for political speech are particularly strong because
they, by definition, will concern governmental affairs.297 Likewise, the
Supreme Court has affirmed the tremendous public benefits associated with
academic speech.298 Both are central to the core value of Pickering: “having
free and unhindered debate on matters of public importance.”299 At the other
end of the spectrum is speech involving mere personal concerns, which will
very likely fail the public concern test.300 On occasion, content of other
varieties may favor employees.301
Numerous courts have placed undue emphasis on the speaker’s motive as
part of the public concern analysis.302 This can lead courts to the conclusion
that the contested speech was the extension of a personal grievance and, thus,
rule against the employee.303 This misinterprets Connick, which considered

294. Menell, supra note 9, at 42.
295. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571–72 (1968).
296. Wales v. Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 82, 85 (7th Cir. 1997).
297. Bork, supra note 72, at 28; see Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 387 (1987).
298. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
299. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 573.
300. Allred, supra note 32, at 72; see Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 (1983); supra
Part I.E.1.c.
301. See supra Part I.E.1.d.
302. See Ma, supra note 29, at 133; Schoen, supra note 49, at 17.
303. See Allred, supra note 32, at 72–75.
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motive but primarily during the subsequent balancing test.304 Considering
motive is inherently fact intensive and inappropriate to evaluate during the
Connick inquiry, which is a question of law.305 Motive can be relevant in
determining the speaker’s credibility, but otherwise it should not play much
of a role in the Pickering analysis.306 This is also more consistent with
whistleblower statutes, which are unconcerned with why a person discloses
information.307
It is evident that content is given the most weight of the three factors, form
given the least, and the weight given to context varies depending on the
particular circumstances.308 Content may be the preeminent factor, but it
should not be considered a necessary condition as this would make a single
factor dispositive, which the Supreme Court has forbidden.309 This question
is most pressing when public employees testify in court.310 Considering
Pickering’s abhorrence for bright-line rules, judges must have the discretion
to weigh these factors as the situation demands.311 Justice Brennan noted in
his Connick dissent that rote analysis of content, form, and context is too
formalistic to genuinely evaluate the overwhelming variety of speech that
could implicate public concerns.312 Judicial discretion is necessary to adapt
Connick to a wide array of factual permutations.313 For speech made during
judicial proceedings, a court should weigh context more heavily given the
public benefits of encouraging truthful and open testimony.314
B. Reconciling Garcetti
Garcetti’s “as a citizen” requirement not only suppresses whistleblowing
but also harms government interests.315 More specifically, it incentivizes
employees to publicly air their concerns rather than use official channels to
address those concerns more privately.316 Garcetti arguably conflicts with
precedent that specifically found private disclosures to be protected.317 The
304. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 152 (considering the questionnaire’s “purpose” during the
balancing stage). Each question that Sheila Myers asked her colleagues had very similar form,
context, and motive. See id. at 155–56. Yet, one question was considered related to a public
concern because of its relation to political campaigning. Id. at 149.
305. Id. at 148 n.7.
306. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968) (“[A]bsent proof of false
statements knowingly or recklessly made by him, a teacher’s exercise of his right to speak on
issues of public importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public
employment.”).
307. Dorsey, supra note 22, at 78.
308. See supra Parts I.E.1–3.
309. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 454 (2011); Butler v. Bd. of Cty., 920 F.3d 651,
666 (10th Cir. 2019) (Lucero, J., dissenting).
310. See Rumel, supra note 38, at 285–92.
311. See Butler, 920 F.3d at 665 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
312. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 163–64 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
313. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569 (1968).
314. See Rumel, supra note 38, at 292.
315. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 427 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
316. Id.
317. See Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414 (1979).
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Court also acknowledged that the decision could endanger academic
freedom.318
Limiting the scope of the “as a citizen” requirement would greatly aid
whistleblowers. The Court may be amenable to changes considering their
treatment of the question in Lane, their most recent foray into public
employee speech.319 Justice Sotomayor’s use of the phrasing “ordinary job
responsibilities” to describe when an employee spoke in his or her official
capacity rather than Garcetti’s “official duties” terminology implies a more
limited reading.320 Any significance of the shift is unclear, but a more limited
reading is possible, bearing in mind the maxim that “exceptions to First
Amendment protections should be narrowly construed.”321
A variation of Justice Souter’s approach to speech as an employee would
create a framework less likely to restrict informative speech, particularly of
whistleblowers.322 To begin, Garcetti appears to imply that public
employees are not citizens when they are speaking in their official capacity—
an inaccurate characterization.323 Rather than finding that speech spoken as
an employee is completely unqualified for First Amendment protection, the
Garcetti and Connick threshold inquiries could be viewed in tandem rather
than in isolation.324 Unlike Justice Souter’s suggestion to merge Garcetti
into the balancing inquiry, this would preserve the current structure of the
test and is more consistent with the Court’s language.325 This design would
require employees speaking in their official capacity to make a heightened
showing of public concern to demonstrate that their speech touched on what
Justice Souter calls matters of “unusual importance.”326 The precise line
between matters of unusual importance and just normal importance would be
hazy, but it could still be analyzed using the Connick factors, requiring that
content, form, and context weigh more heavily in favor of the employee than
usual.327 Such an analysis would reassert the primacy of the public concern
test, the embodiment of the public’s First Amendment interest that Pickering
espouses.328

318. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425 (majority opinion).
319. See supra notes 134–36 and accompanying text.
320. See Rumel, supra note 38, at 261–64.
321. See id. at 264.
322. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 435 (Souter, J., dissenting).
323. Id. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
324. See id. at 434 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“But why do the majority’s concerns, which we
all share, require categorical exclusion of First Amendment protection against any official
retaliation for things said on the job?”).
325. Pickering refers to arriving at a balance between the interests of the employer and the
employee, “as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern.” Pickering v. Bd. of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). Similarly, Garcetti characterizes the analysis as two
inquiries, with the first encompassing both threshold determinations and the second as the
balancing test. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418 (majority opinion).
326. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 435 (Souter, J., dissenting).
327. Id.
328. See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text.
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C. The Continuing Need for Pickering
The presence or absence of adequate statutory measures have no bearing
on constitutional rights that have “never depended on the vagaries of state or
federal law.”329 A public employee’s right to free speech is unaffected by
whether or not a legislature has extended protections to certain spheres.330
Additionally, baseline constitutional safeguards allow legislatures to
reinforce specific areas where protections may be lacking with more specific
measures.331 They also guard against gaps in protection that a legislature
may have neglected with targeted statutes.332 Recognizing greater
constitutional protections for whistleblowers would encourage disclosures by
public employees who can provide such a valuable service for society.333
Objections that this burdens government employers are overblown when
employer interests still receive ample consideration in the final balancing
test.334 Although the Pickering standard has become somewhat distorted
since its inception, it is still useful for protecting public employees.335
This is not to say that the multitude of statutory protections granted to
whistleblowers are superfluous; legislatures may enact additional measures
as they see fit.336 With all of the psychological barriers that inhibit
whistleblowers, statutes can be vital in providing incentives for those
considering coming forward.337 Statutes can protect whistleblowers in ways
that would not be possible through the Constitution alone, such as
establishing procedures to ensure whistleblower anonymity.338 Of course,
statutes are also needed to protect private sector whistleblowers who cannot
rely on free speech.339
CONCLUSION
Constitutional protections for whistleblowers have undergone radical
changes as the Pickering standard has evolved over the years.340 Connick
embodies Pickering’s core value of improving public discourse by requiring

329. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 439 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v.
Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 680 (1996)).
330. See id.
331. See, e.g., Dorsey, supra note 22, at 48–49.
332. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 440–41 (Souter, J., dissenting); Berkebile, supra note 291,
at 21.
333. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968).
334. See Ma, supra note 29, at 138.
335. See VAUGHN, supra note 7, at 5 (“[Whistleblower laws] can also be perceived as a
part of human rights law, protecting freedom of expression.”).
336. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425 (majority opinion).
337. See Menell, supra note 9, at 37–42.
338. Senator Rand Paul stirred controversy at President Trump’s impeachment trial when
he appeared to name the previously anonymous whistleblower on the Senate floor. Jordain
Carney, Rand Paul Reads Alleged Whistleblower’s Name on the Senate Floor, HILL (Feb. 4,
2020, 1:13 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/481417-rand-paul-reads-allegedwhistleblowers-name-on-senate-floor [https://perma.cc/65PN-EMF7].
339. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
340. See supra Part I.D.
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that speech touch on topics of societal importance.341 It is vital that courts
analyze the content, form, and context of public employee speech through
this lens.342 Greater consistency is possible by recognizing that Pickering
sought to give special protection to speech that informed the public.343
Political and academic speech most clearly fill this role, although not
exclusively.344 Government whistleblowers, who will typically engage in
political speech, should enjoy substantial constitutional safeguards.345
Furthermore, reading Garcetti in conjunction with Connick could avoid
chilling valuable speech simply because of who was speaking at the time.346
It contradicts Pickering’s stated purpose by quashing valuable speech simply
because an employee acted in his or her official capacity.347 Providing a
mechanism for public employees to overcome Garcetti through a heightened
public concern showing is more consistent with Pickering’s central
holding.348

341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.

See supra notes 105–11 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.A.
See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968).
See supra Part I.E.1.
See supra Part I.E.1.a.
See supra Part III.B.
See Rumel, supra note 38, at 244–46.
See id.

